Bayesian confirmation theorists have proposed a variety of solutions to
I argue that the Bayesian evidence relation is not sufficient or necessary to determine what counts as evidence.
Such difficulties warrant pursuit of alternative explica tions of evidential relevance. I show how the raven's paradox may be avoided by bringing in causal considerations.
Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance
Tell me what thy lordly name is on the Night's Plutonian shore!" Quoth the Raven, "Nevermore." Much I marvelled this ungainly fowl to hear discourse so plainly, Though its answer little meaning-little relevancy bore;
... And the Raven, never flitting, still is sitting, still is sitting On the pallid bust of Pallas just above my chamber door.
-Edgar Allan Poe . The Raven.
I. Introduction
Over the past several decades, Bayesianism has proved to be a fruitful approach to confirmation theory, yet it retains flaws that should make us wary of embracing it wholeheartedly. Bayes theorem provides a framework for rationally updating our quantitative degrees of belief in propositions as evidence is gathered, but a more basic task of a theory of scientific confirmation is to explicate the evidence relation itself-that is, the basis upon which data counts as being evidentially relevant to some hypothesized fact about the empirical world-and on this point Bayesianism The Paradox of the Ravens was first described in (Hempel 1965) . The paradox es arise out of two prima facie reasonable theses having to do with the confirmation of universal hypotheses. The first, Nicod's Sufficient Condition of confirmation, holds that hypotheses of the form "All P's are Q's" are confirmed by their instances, that is, true propositions (or "facts") to the effect that "Object k is both P and Q." The second, the Equivalence Condition, states that if some evidence-statement E confirms a hypothesis H, and H is logically equivalent to hypothesis J, then E also confirms J. For a paradox to feel truly paradoxical its premises should be ones that we are not willing to abandon easily, so let us briefly examine the motivation of each of these.
Nicod-confirmation has Prima facie a good deal of intuitive appeal. We do quite typically consider that instances of a universal hypothesis are supportive of it. Are all politicians untrustworthy? "Well, every one that I ever knew of was," says the cynic, "so I'd believe it." Of course, nobody would claim that this was a conclusive argument-maybe somewhere there is a lone trustworthy public official working in obscurity against incredible odds-but most people would have no trouble agreeing that instances of untrustworthy politicians do confirm the hypothe sis in the sense that they provide evidential support for it, and this is the sense of "confirm" that we are interested in for confirmation theor y. Similarly, taking the hypothesis "All ravens are black" we would regard observation of an object that is both a raven and black as confirmatory. Putting this formally, where "R" means "raven" and "B" means "black ," our hypothesis
is confirmed by the instance Ra & Ba.
We could therefore confirm a hypothesis to the effect that all ravens are black by making observations of black ravens. This is the first element of the Raven Paradox.
The Equivalence Condition is even more intuitively compelling. It states that evidence that supports a hypothesis, H, is equally supportive of all other hypotheses that are logically equivalent to H. The motivation here is straightforward; put simply, the specific terms in which a hypothesis is expressed, so long as they have the same meaning, should be irrelevant to the relation of confirmation. It thus follows that evidence which confirms the universal conditional hypothesis (i) should also confirm its contrapositive, the logically equivalent hypothesis that
and vice versa. This second expression is the typical translation of the hypothesis that "All non-black things are non-ravens." This is the second element of the Raven Paradox.
The paradoxical nature of the two propositions is seen when they are compared with a third strong intuition, namely, that our ordinary observations of white shoes or green vases are typically thought to be irrelevant to the hypothesis that all ravens are black, and certainly are not supportive of it. If they were, then Poe's protago nist might have been able to collect evidence in favor of the raven hypothesis from within his chamber even if the odd bird had never entered it, but this seems absurd.
There also seem to be good reasons to think that we need to look at ravens rather -3-than shoes and vases; thinking of possible worlds with the various logical combina tions of black and non-black as they apply to objects in the universe, even if we were to check the color of all objects that are not ravens , eliminating logically possible worlds as we go, we would not have eliminated any of the possible color combina tions for the ravens. That is, logically possible worlds in which all, some or no ravens are black remain untouched by the observations of non-ravens. The strong intuition that ornithologists may not practice their science from a chair in front of the living room fireplace is the third element of the paradox. With a nod to Nelson Goodman, we will call this the No-Indoor-Ornithology Intuition.
The three propositions appear to be incompatible. According to the Nicod condition, hypothesis (ii) is confirmed by instances of the form:
That is, it is confirmed by observations of white shoes and green vases and other objects that are neither ravens nor black. But hypothesis (ii) is logically equivalent to hypothesis (i), and so, by the Equivalence Condition, evidence that supports it should support the other as well. Taking Nicod's Condition and the Equivalence Condition together we thus get the conclusion that white shoes and green vases do indeed confirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black, violating the no-indoor -ornithology intuition.
The Raven Paradox thus may be summarized as follows:
(1) Nicod's Sufficient Condition:
(2) Principle of Equivalence:
No-Indoor-Ornithology Intuition:
Observations of white shoes are not evidence for the hypothesis that "All ravens are black"; they are irrelevant to the hypothesis.
The paradox may be resolved by rejecting any one or more of the elements. One could hold that instances do not confirm in the way Nicod proposed, and reject (1). Hempel claimed that (3) should be rejected, arguing that the intuition is based upon a psychological illusion. Phillip Rody (Rody 1978) attempted to resolve the paradox by modifying (2). Bayesian confirmation theorists typically have urged rejection of (3) and usually also (1). I will take a seemingly even more radical tack and suggest an interpretation by which (1), (2) Bayesian confirmation theorists want to resolve the paradox by distinguishing degrees of confirmation. They will argue that, strictly speaking, (3) is false -observation of non-black , non-ravens can lend support to the hypothesis-but practically speaking it might as well be true, because the support it lends is very small compared to the support provided by observation of black ravens. Drawing distinctions and trying to show how we can reject a particular element without seriously compromising our intuitions is the classic approach to squeezing out of aporetic tight spots. Bayesians achieve their result by showing how assumptions of relative class size can make different evidence-statements confer different degrees of confirmation on a hypothesis. Patrick Suppes, who was the first to articulate a Bayesian solution to the paradox, argued that in evaluating the evidential bearing of observational evidence -statements on the raven hypothesis we are tacitly relying upon knowledge about the relative proportions of ravens and black objects in the universe. (Suppes 1966) This implicit background knowledge has a significant effect, he claimed, on how much a bit of evidence really tests the hypothesis. The following table exhausts the pos sible combinations of the predicates "raven" and "black" and thus represents the four types of evidence-statements that these predicates can form. The letters in the cells refer to the relative frequency of entities satisfying that combination of predicates in the universe, or to the probability that a randomly selected object will in stantiate that combination. Suppes claimed, and he is surely right, that we know that there are far fewer black ravens in the universe than there are non-black non-ravens. That is, we know:
With this knowledge in hand we can compare the probability that a given randomly selected raven will be black to the probability that a given randomly selected non-black thing will be a non-raven, and we find that:
Taking the complements of these, we also know that the probability that a raven will not be black is much greater than the probability that a non-black thing will turn out to be a raven. That is:
Suppes thought that this inequality can help resolve the Ravens Paradox. Acknowledging that such calculations based on prior probabilities alone do not compel us to sample one way rather than another , Suppes suggested two general principles, either of which, when taken together with the inequality above, tells us that we should choose to sample ravens rather than non-black things.
The first is an economic principle that in seeking to achieve a given goal one should choose the method with the minimum cost or effort. The second principle, which Suppes took to be derivable from the first, is the prescription that "we should always try to take observations so as to maximize the probability of falsifying the hypothesis in question." (Suppes 1966, p. 200 The intuition at issue was that black ravens confirm and white shoes do not confirm the raven hypothesis, but Suppes now seems to be answering a different question, namely:
The central question is why we are right in our intuitive assumption that we should look at randomly selected ravens and not randomly selected non-black things in testing the generalization that all ravens are black. (Suppes 1966, p. 199) The difference is slight but significant, and this is not the intuition that we were originally worried about. We must be clear about what is going on; Suppes solution is to reject the original no-indoor-ornithology intuition in the strict sense and to get us to shift focus and accept that our intuition was actually about this other question. So, again, what Could degree of corroboration count as degree of confirmation? At first glance it seems reasonable to say that a hypothesis is better supported if it passes severe tests than if it passes simple tests, and thus that passing tests does confer some degree of confirmation. This would fit with Suppes' view that a black raven that was observed in a sample of ravens carries more evidential weight than a white shoe that was observed in a sample of non-black things, because in the former case the raven hypothesis passed a more severe test than in the second case. But everyone (so far) agrees that observing a black raven is better than observing a white shoe. The question is whether this is trivially so because observing the white shoe has no evidential weight at all. If the hypothesis was put at risk (even a very small risk) when the sample was made from non-black objects, then, assuming that surviving tests really does provide confirmation, we should conclude that the observation of the white shoe did have some weight. But was the hypothesis really put at risk when we sampled non-black things? Suppes calculated the risk-factor on the assumption that all the cells in the grid had a non-zero probability. However, if the hypothesis is true, then cell c, which represented the proportion of non-black ravens, should be empty. And in this case, because the probability of getting an element of c in the sample is 0, observing non-black things did not put the hypothesis at risk at all, which was what Suppes requires for corroborative confirmation. This leaves us with the absurd conclusion that when the hypothesis is true the observations cannot corroboratively confirm it, but that when it is false they can. It is an open question whether the hypothesis is true or false (otherwise we would not be testing it), so it is not sufficient to simply ask what is the probability of falsification if the hypothesis is false; we must also consider the probabilities on the assumption that it is true, which Suppes failed to do.
However, Bayesians may still have an out if they can rework the argument while considering the possibility that the hypothesis is true.
Paul Horwich did
2 "It is not so much the number of corroborating instances which determines the degree of corroboration as the severity of the various tests to which the hypothesis in question can be, and has been, subjected." [The emphasis is Popper's.] (Popper 1959, p. 267) -7-precisely this in his Probability and Evidence (Horwich 1982) so it is to his discussion that we now turn.
Horwich argues, as Suppes did, that it is "our background assumptions concern ing the proportion of ravens and black objects in the universe [that] affect the extent to which hypotheses are confirmed by various kinds of evidence" (Horwich 1982, p. 56) , and he, too, makes this work for him by connecting degree of confirmation to degree of corroboration. Horwich writes:
We would expect that the best evidence would be provided when a machine selected raven turns out to be black (R* B), for in that case, H is subject to the maximum risk of falsification and has passed the most severe test. But when a known black thing is scrutinized and found to be a raven (B* R), this evidence does not test the hypothesis at all: no discovery about it could jeopardize the hypothesis. [Emphasis added.] (Horwich 1982, p. 58) Horwich's contribution is to make his calculations using both the prior and condi tional background beliefs (i.e., respectively, that the hypothesis may be false and that it is true), and initially to assume nothing about them except that they meet the minimal Bayesian requirement of conforming to the probability calculus.3 Hor wich's diagram shows the probabilities for all the possible options for both the prior and the conditional cases. The probability in cell c is redistributed to the other cells when we conditionalize on the hypothesis H together with the background 3 It is really the second part here that Horwich takes to be his original contribution , for J. L. Mackie had previously attempted what amounts to a Bayesian solution that considered the prior and conditional probabilities (Mackie 1963) , but had made the further assumption that the subjective probability of selecting a raven and the probability of selecting a black thing are independent of whether or not one supposes that all ravens are black, (i.e. that cell delta is greater than cell d, and cell alpha is greater than cell a in Figure 2 ). This led to a number of results that Horwich found implausible: (1) Observation of a black nonraven slightly disconfirms the hypothesis (instead of being irrelevant), and (2) Observations of a randomly-selected object that turns out to be a black raven, a randomly-selected raven that turns out to be black, and a randomly-selected black thing that turns out to be a raven, all confer equal confirmation on the hypothesis (instead of being, according to Horwich, respectively, irrelevant, supportive, and irrelevant). I will not discuss Mackie's results here, but will just mention that I differ with Horwich's assessment of (2), but agree that (1) is unacceptable. We may also point out in passing that it is noteworthy that there are so many Bayesian "solutions" to the Raven paradox. That even Bayesians cannot agree on how to apply Bayes Theorem to specific problems in confirmation should alert us that there is more to Bayesian confirmation theory than the theorem itself. We must keep distinct the validity of Bayesian conditionalization as theorem of the probablity calculus, and its proposed philosophical use as an explication of the evidence relation for scientific confirmation.
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Figure 2. Horwich's System information, but Horwich points out that we may not presume how it will be divided; it may all go into a single cell, or be apportioned equally among all three, or apportioned differentially.
If we now compare the conditionalized probabilities of the hypothesis on the evidence of two randomly selected objects, one of which turns out to be a black raven and the other of which turns out to be a white shoe, we get the following results.
However, according to Norwich, because we may not presume how c is divided, we may not presume that cell alpha is greater than cell a, and, therefore, neither may we presume that alpha divided by a is greater than 1. The same holds true for cell delta and cell d. This means that, for all we know, both posterior probabilities reduce to the original prior probability. In other words, observations of black ravens and white shoes are irrelevant-the hypothesis is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by either sort of evidence. This result by itself should be cause for rejecting Horwich's approach, but let us first complete his story, for it gets even more interesting.
Horwich again follows Suppes in arguing that the way evidence is gathered is telling for whether the observations are more or less confirmatory (recall what he said above about the varying risks of falsification). The results of calculation based on observations made of, say, randomly selected member of the class of ravens, or randomly selected member of the class of non-black things, are very different from those obtained by conditionalizing on the observations of randomly selected member of the class of objects. As was defined in the quoted passage from Horwich, an asterisk is to mean "randomly selected member of the class of", modifying the previous predicate. Thus, "R* B" should be read to mean "randomly selected (1)
(The calculations for the evidence R* not-B and not-B* R are omitted as the only uncontroversial points in the debate-not even a Duhemian could seriously disagree with the conclusion that these falsify the hypothesis.) The key feature of this result is that all the conditionalizations reduce to the prior probability, except (1) and (3). That is, the only observations that confer any evidential support are of randomly selected ravens that turn out to be black, and randomly selected non-black things that turn out to be non-ravens. Now, comparing the relative support of these two sorts of evidence given our additional background information that the propor tion of non-black non-ravens (i.e., cell d) in the universe is close to 1, we find that:
Thus, a randomly selected white object that happened to be a shoe does raise the probability of the hypothesis, but only negligibly compared to a randomly selected raven that turns out to be black. Horwich thinks this inequality is an adequate explanation of the intuitions that led to the Raven Paradox. Let us now summarize at what price this purported solution is bought. Horwich's approach requires that we: (1) Reject Nicod's Condition (because it entails that random observation of positive instances must confirm a hypothesis).
(2) Reject the No-Indoor-Ornithology Intuition (because a white shoe, if selected randomly from a collection of non-black things does slightly confirm the hypothesis). (3) Accept the conclusion that, under ordinary conditions, observation of a black raven from a sample of random objects is evidentially irrelevant to the hypothesis.
In return the Bayesians offer the power and fine-grained resolution of the 4 One complete calculation (for (1)) runs as follows:
Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance 11 probability calculus and flexibility of Bayesian conditionalization. This latter feature makes explicit, for example, how the notion of plausibility considerations, which practicing scientists certainly seem to make use of, could enter into the process of confirmation (i.e., they could be expressed in the priors), though one could counter that plausibility should not be a separate evidential consideration. It could show why predictions that are novel might be thought to do more to support a hypothesis than those which are not (i.e., because this information is included in the denomina tor as the probability of the evidence-the likelihood-and the posterior probability of the hypothesis on the evidence is inversely proportional to that value), though, again, there is some doubt that novelty should have this effect as has recently been discussed by (Collins 1994) . There are other potential virtues as well. However, there are also well-known vices that are peculiar to it-the problem of old evidence, the problem of new theories, the problem of the interpretation of the probability values, the problem of how to assign priors, and others.5 So, though Horwich's account does have its benefits, I want to argue, by emphasizing the weight of the intuitions that it forces us to reject, that, on balance, the price of accepting it is too high when we consider its conclusions about relevance relations.
Horwich's account entails that black ravens randomly selected from the uni verse of objects provide no support to the hypothesis that all ravens are black, and in fact are irrelevant (and this irrespective of their relative proportion in the population). This seems implausible even when the observation is of only a single raven, but as observations are multiplied it becomes ridiculous. An enthusiastic investigator could keep on randomly sampling objects forever, eventually observing any number of black ravens (and no non-black ravens), and she would still not be licensed to increase her confidence in the hypothesis an iota. However, simply by changing her sampling procedure and looking at random ravens rather than random objects she could raise the degree of confirmation on observation of a single black raven.
If this were not enough, Horwich also asks that we reject the No-Indoor -Ornithology Intuition and allow that the hypothesis that all ravens are black is confirmed by observations of white shoes and green vases (provided that they are sampled randomly from non-black things, and not sampled from random objects). The intuitive dissonance here is equally unacceptable, and Bayesians tacitly admit this, for they invariably hasten to try to soften the punch of the paradox by showing that though Bayesian conditionalization does allow non-black non-ravens to support the raven hypothesis, it does so only a very small amount. But the problem remains, for, even in the scenario that the Bayesians present, given enough time and enough observations of non-black non-ravens a person who grows up never having seen any ravens at all could still find her confidence in the hypothesis that ravens are black slowly but steadily increasing over the years . Such a system would allow one to confirm, for example, the prejudicial hypothesis that all Texans are yahoos without knowing anything at all about Texans besides being able to observe that the non-yahoos one happens to be acquainted with are not from Texas. Second, if a Bayesian were to bite the bullet on such examples and insist upon the relative proportion argument, we might point out that such considerations are beside the point since it remains the case that the Bayesian evidential relation allows confirmation of the raven hypothesis by non-black non-ravens simpliciter, that is, even without that background information. What the relative class size argument does is attempt to explain away the no-indoor-ornithology intuition with the claim that it is actually based upon such implicit background assumptions. Of course it is true that background information does make a difference to confirmation, and one can easily construct fantasy scenarios in which a white shoe would confirm the raven hypothesis-say, by being an agreed-upon sign from previous observers to indicate this is a black raven world. The no-indoor-ornithology intuition will not hold universally, but it does seem to hold in the realistic cases we have been considering. And once we make explicit the background assumption about relative class size we should be able to judge the purported confirmation with and without it, and I think that the no-indoor-ornithology intuition remains in both these cases, in opposition to the Bayesian result.
I judge that the merits of Horwich's Bayesian "solution" to the Raven paradox do not outweigh these considerations, and conclude that his approach is unaccepta ble.
IV.
Other course, disprove the Bayesian approach. Other solutions may yet work out better, and, in any case, one may judge that difficulties involving the Raven Paradox alone should not be telling against a procedure as promising as Bayesianism. But there are other problems already in the balance, as was mentioned, and I want now to briefly add a few more.
IV. 1. Relevance problems of H-D Method all apply to Bayesianism Adolf Grunbaum (Grunbaum 1976, pp. 238-9, 243 ) discussed the relation of Bayesian confirmation to Popperian Falisification and argued that Bayesianism is unacceptable because it licenses absurd confirmations. Consider the hypothesis that drinking coffee every morning for a couple of weeks cures colds. We now run an informal experiment in which Jones, who has a cold, faithfully follows the principle and finds himself cured before the month is out. This result was entailed by the hypothesis, so the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis is 1. Also, though one might say that it was extremely likely that he would have recovered even without the treatment, we would have to agree that the prior probability of the evidence was something less than 1. One might have argued that the hypothesis had no initial plausibility, but Bayesians typically are forced for other reasons to claim that one should always apply a principle of open-mindedness and assign even implausible hypotheses with a non-zero probability. With these numbers in place we see that the evidence could not fail to raise the probability of the hypothesis, and so confirm it. Although he did not put it this way, Grunbaum's point is that allowing this sort of confirmation is tantamount to vindicating the absurd principle post hoc ergo propter hoc-that is, whatever happens after some A, happens because of A. John Earman, (Earman 1992, p. 102-4) , replies to Grunbaum on behalf of Bayesianism, but admits that he has no response to the core worry about causal hypotheses except a conviction that causal talk is best avoided altogether. Bad news for the Bayesian, but I think it is even worse when one looks specifically at the evidential relevance relations. I want now to show how the calculations that drive Grunbaum's criticism can be reapplied to generate for Bayesian confirmation the very same sort of relevance paradoxes and trivializations that led to the demise of Hypothetico-Deductivism.
(1) The Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction. Take any hypothesis, H, and some statement, D, deduced from it. The likelihood of D given H is 1, and it will remain 1 even if any irrelevant hypothesis is conjoined to the original hypothesis (by the rule of strengthening the antecedent). Thus if D confirms the initial hypothesis, it will also confirm the combined one. Like the H-D method, Bayesianism puts no constraints upon the type of hypotheses that may be tested in the framework, so to emphasize the counter-intuitive nature of this result let us look at a case in which the evidential irrelevance is clear-one that conjoins an empirical hypothesis to a (3) Russell's Winged-Pig Problem. From the hypothesis that "All pigs have wings," and the background knowledge that "Pork is good to eat," we may deduce the observable prediction that "Some winged things are good to eat," and so assign its likelihood probability 1. But again, we have profound doubts that an observa tion that ducks are good to eat should give us any confidence that pigs have wings. A Bayesian could object that the likelihood of the evidence in this example is not between 0 and 1 (as is required for the conclusion to go through), but must be assigned a probability of 1 because it is already known for certain to be true, and thus on conditionalization the posterior probability would not increase over the prior. But it is a merely contingent fact that we happen to know that some winged things are good to eat, and we can easily imagine the test being done by a commu nity of scientists for whom this was not generally known (perhaps because of religious strictures against the eating of fowl). And, again, the peculiarities of the example are not important, for one can easily construct any number of such problems following Russell's model.
IV. 2. The Problem of Old Evidence Revisited
It might appear that Bayesianism actually fares a tad better than Hypothetico -Deductivism because not just any fact can be adduced as evidence, as it may for the H-D Method. In particular, if the fact adduced as a datum were already known to be true, as in the previous example, its probability would therefore be 1, and in such a case the probability of the hypothesis would not change on conditionalization. That is, its posterior probability would be the same as its prior, because multiplying and dividing by the other two factors (the likelihood and expectedness both being unity) would have no effect. So though any prediction that is deduced (such as the cloudy day in Principe) would have to raise the probability of the hypothesis, old evidence would not. Thus, the simple deductive relation appears not to be sufficient to provide evidential relevance on the Bayesian model in the way it is sufficient for H-D. This purported advantage over Hypothetico-Deductivism would be small comfort, however , for it also implies that old evidence can never be evidentially relevant for a hypothesis, as was shown by Glymour (Glymour 1980, p. 86) even though in practice scientists do use old evidence to support new theories; Einstein argued for the gravitational field equations on the basis that they explained the anomalous advance of the perihelion of Mercury-data that were already in place before Einstein developed his General Theory of Relativity. Attempted Bayesian solutions to this horrible problem have the look of desperation about them, trying, for example, to avoid the result by bringing in counterfactual degrees of belief in the evidence, or arguing that logical deductions may not necessarily be given a probability of unity. (Garber 1983) I would like now to briefly pursue an alternative solution to the Problem of Old Evidence, but one that will bring no solace to the Bayesian, for it takes away the slight possible advantage over the H-D Method noted. The upshot, I believe, is that Bayesians face a dilemma on this particular issue of relevance: if they adopt the solution I propose they licence as relevant all that led to the demise of the H-D Method, and if they reject the solution they remain with the Problem of Old Evidence, and are forced to call irrelevant data that we judge to be relevant. Glymour introduced the problem in the following manner:
Old evidence can in fact confirm new theory, but according to Bayesian kinematics it cannot. For let us suppose that evidence e is known at before theory T is introduced at time t. Because e is known at t, Probt(e)=1. Further, because Probt(e)=1, the likelihood of e given T, Probt(e, T), is also 1. We then have
The conditional probability of T on e is therefore the same as the prior probability of T: e cannot constitute evidence for T in virtue of the positive relevance condition nor in virtue of the likelihood of e on T. None of the Bayesian mechanisms apply, and if we are strictly limited to them, we have the absurdity that old evidence cannot confirm new theory. The result is fairly stable. If the probability of e is very high but not unity, Probe(e, T) will still be unity if T entails e, and so Probt(T, e) will be very close to Probe (T). (Glymour 1980, p. 86) The final comment about stability where the probability of the evidence is very high but not unity comes into play when considering intuitions about the strength of supporting evidence, but it clearly is a weaker argument counter-example than the core absurdity that old evidence cannot confirm new theory at all on the Bayesian evidential relation. Glymour claimed that physicists found Einstein's argument regarding the perihelion data "enormously forceful," but this is psychological claim that, while probably true, is at least open to question. And even if the psychologi cal claim is true, that is not necessarily an argument that the data should be highly confirmatory, so a Bayesian might argue that the possibility of ad hoc tailoring of theory to the data means that old evidence is not trustworthy. Furthermore, since Bayesians argue in terms of incremental confirmation (where evidential support comes from probability increases) rather than absolute confirmation (where it comes from reaching a particular probability value-say, greater than one-half), the near unity position allows them to claim at least some evidential support from old evidence and the critic is forced to argue the details on a case by case basis. It might also be possible to distinguish two types of incremental confirmation based upon absolute increment, where the increase is of some specific delta value, versus
proportional increment, where it is the delta probability value relative to the prior probability that is considered. I have not seen this done, but a Bayesian might admit that the absolute increment is very slight in the case where the probability of the old evidence is very nearly unity, but make an argument that it is the propor tional increment that is relevant for confirmation. And in a case of a new theory, like General Relativity Theory, the prior probability of the hypothesis is very nearly zero, so though its posterior probability may be quite low on an absolute scale, it may yet count as confirmatory proportionally.
I do not mean to endorse any of these options; rather, I propose them to point out that the "near unity" situation leaves the Bayesian with room to move and is thus less persuasive than the powerful "unity" argument. Furthermore, the Bayesian could argue that it is the "near unity" situation that they actually face. Glymour set up the problem of old evidence with the claim that "Because e is known at t, Probt(e)=1", but this probability assignment is not argued for in any way, and substantial argument would be called for because this is not a reasonable assignment for an empiricist to make. Even stronger than the principle of open-mindedness, which says never to assign a probability of zero to any hypothesis, is what we might call a "principle of humility", which would be never to assign a probability of unity to any empirical proposition; though we clearly have practical or perhaps "moral" certainty about all sorts of empirical facts, theoretical certainty about them is never possible for an empiricist.
Thus, so long as we choose to work within the camp of empiricism, the claim on which the strong problem of old evidence is presented is unfounded in a rather profound way.
Glymour did consider, in passing, the possible response that the prior probabil ity of the evidence is not unity, but he did not take it seriously, calling it a "Red herring" (Glymour 1980, p. 86) because "the acceptance of old evidence may make -17-the degree of belief in it as close to unity as our degree of belief in some bit of evidence ever is." (Glymour 1980, p. 87) While this is incontestable, it is not sufficient for the quick red herring dismissal . The above considerations indicate how the near unity situation leaves the Bayesian with room to maneuver. As the moves are played out, I suspect that the problem of old evidence will remain problematic in particular cases even from the near unity position, but this is not a foregone conclusion. A more certain conclusion , however, is that, even if the Bayesians adopted and could sustain the argument against the unity position to avoid the Problem of Old Evidence, this would be a very mixed blessing because it would reopen the global relevance problems associated with logical deduction, truly making Bayesianism as hopeless as Hypothetico-Deductivism. If the prior proba bility of the evidence must be less than one and the conditional probability of all logical deductions from the hypothesis is unity, Bayesianism would license all inferences that follow the Hypothetico-Deductive classical pattern. Therefore, unless we return to the Garber's valiant but desperate ploy to give logical deductions a lower probability value, all the considerations that bear against the simple H-D evidential relation necessarily infect Bayesianism.
IV. 3.
Bayesian evidence neither sufficient nor necessary
Stepping back momentarily to survey the big picture again, our concern in this paper is with the question of whether Bayesianism properly explicates the relation of evidential relevance. Bayesian confirmation theory advances the idea that confirming a hypothesis means raising our degree of belief in it, given the data-H is incrementally confirmed if Pr(H)<Pr(H/D).
Concomitantly, His incremental ly disconfirmed if Pr(H)>Pr(H/D).
Change in degree of belief upon conditional ization is, thus, the essence of the evidence relation according to Bayesianism; it is on this basis alone that a particular D counts as evidentially relevant to H for a Bayesian. The primary appeal of this view hinges upon the probabilistic formalism and the Dutch book arguments that show why it is problematic not to revise one's beliefs in a statistically coherent manner. Nevertheless, I think it is wrong to reduce confirmation to mere coherent belief revision and to equate evidential relevance and statistical relevance in this way. That a datum raises one's degree of belief of a given hypothesis, I want to argue, is neither sufficient nor necessary for it to count as positive evidence for the hypothesis.7
The insufficiency of the formulation has already been suggested by the paradox es. Though Bayesians have proposed potential solutions to individual paradoxes,
we have seen that any number of variations may be generated by clever use of the 7 For simplicity, I will provide arguments only against the Bayesian relation of positive confirmation, but they apply with only minor modification to Bayesian disconfirma tion as well. axiomatic requirement that logical entailments are to receive a probability of 1. If one were to want to test Galileo's law of falling bodies one might choose some initial conditions and calculate an expected outcome, say, that "the dropped cannonball hits the ground in 19 seconds." As a derived value the probability of this predic tion given the hypothesis is 1, though its prior probability must be less than that. One might avoid the inconvenience of devising a precise method for getting the time measurement, however, by checking the alternative prediction that "the dropped cannonball hits the ground in 19 seconds or the dropped cannonball hits the ground." And rather than spend a billion dollars on a better neutrino detector, one might save the taxpayers some money by checking the prediction "neutrinos are detected or the next egg I crack open will have a single yolk." In both cases the new prediction also has a probability of 1 relative to the hypothesis and less than 1 alone, so if observations reveal the second disjunct to be true then the probability of the hypothesis is necessarily increased. Surely, however, the mere fact that the cannonball hit the ground gives us no particular confidence in Galileo's law and observations of egg yolks tell us nothing about neutrinos. In spite of the increase in probability that these observations entail for the hypothesis, in neither case we would want to claim that they offer any additional support to the hypothesis-they simply are irrelevant. Therefore, increase in probabilistic degree of belief in the hypothesis is not sufficient even for incremental confirmation.
The converse is more difficult to show; here we need to find cases in which the data is recognized as evidentially supportive of the hypothesis even though the posterior probability of the hypothesis given the data is less than or equal to the prior probability of the hypothesis. I offer two counter-examples to the necessary condition claim, beginning with the "less than" case.
The general recipe for the first sort of counter-example appeals to the fact that the prior probability of a hypothesis is usually based upon background knowledge, which most often consists of previous evidence. One can imagine situations in which our intuition is that some new datum, D, evidentially supports the hypothe sis, H, even though D turns out to reduce our degree of belief in H overall by undermining all or part of the background evidence, which, by definition, should mean that D is disconfirming evidence for H on the Bayesian view. For example, based upon his background knowledge-dozens of sightings of what he took to be black ravens-an eager young Bayesian ornithologist assigns a high probability to the raven hypothesis. Then one day he is birding with an experienced ornitholo gist, who identifies a new bird they see as a black raven. Examining this bird, the young ornithologist realizes, to his embarrassment, that this is not the same type as those he had been observing, but some closely related species that, we may imagine, is hard to distinguish. Cranking the numbers through Bayes theorem, this new information necessarily lowers the young ornithologist's degree of belief in the A Bayesian might attempt to avoid this result in several ways. First, one might add a requirement that all the evidence be considered at once. This would rule out counter-examples of the general sort proposed, where later evidence under mines earlier evidence but still favors the hypothesis. But such a move would go against the essential diachronic nature of Bayesian confirmation by which one conditionalizes on new evidence as it comes in. That an observation changes one degree of belief in the hypothesis is just what makes that observation evidentially relevant according to Bayesianism; a requirement that all evidence be considered at once would make this explication of the evidential relation inapplicable to particu lar observations. Second, as a variation on the above, a Bayesian could argue that confirmation is to be judged only in relation to the limit to which the probabilities converge in the long run when scientists have reached the Peircian endpoint of investigation. Though this seems a reasonable view, to adopt it would be to abandon the incremental notion of confirmation as increase in probability. If we think that probabilities must converge on either 1 or 0 to be confirmed or disconfirmed, then we have opted for absolute confirmation. On the other hand, if we think that the probability could converge on a figure between 0 and 1, then we must admit that a hypothesis could be simultaneously confirmed and disconfirmed from the point of view of different calculators who started with extreme priors on either side of the ultimate figure. On the incremental view the one for whom the probability of the hypothesis rose will judge it confirmed at the endpoint of scientific inquiry and the other will judge it disconfirmed.
My second counter-example is of a case in which we judge D to be evidentially supportive of H even though the Bayesian would have to say that D is irrelevant to H because the conditional probability is equal to the prior. Consider the case of a simple hypothesis that has already been tested and found to be true (say, an existential hypothesis, instances of which have already been found). Since this hypothesis now has a probability of 1 it is impossible that our degree of belief in it can be increased by any data, so for the Bayesian there is no longer any data that is evidentially relevant to it. But surely this is absurd. Imagine our young, but now wary, Bayesian ornithologist who cautiously hypothesizes only "Some ravens are black". The Existential Ravens Hypothesis (ERH) is conclusively confirmed by the sole sighting, under expert guidance, of the single black raven8. Now he sees several more black ravens, but since the truth of ERH is 100% certain, he must conclude that these are, by the Bayesian definition, evidentially irrelevant to ERH since they cannot increase the probability of ERH. Of course we can agree that they are not evidence that we need, since we now are certain of ERH, but that does not mean that they are not evidence of ERH. The prosecutor may have convinced the jury with Exhibit A alone, but surely exhibits B, C and D are objectively still evidence despite that fact.
This sort of case makes a move similar to Glymour's-it shows how the Bayesian notion of statistically incremental confirmation may be blocked when certain probabilities reach unity-although instead of taking previously known data and pointing out that it may still be used to confirm a hypothesis, it takes a previously known hypothesis and points to new data that still can be said to support it. It is thus likely that the Bayesian would try to reply using similar strategies to those used to answer the Problem of Old Evidence. I will not review the arguments again here, but I think they even less persuasive when it is the hypothesis rather than the data that we already know. For example, it would be self-defeating to try to appeal to a counter-factual degree of belief in the hypothesis (i.e., as though it were not known), since the whole point of the Bayesian procedure is to update degrees of belief that one actually have. Once we depart from this it becomes arbitrary from a Bayesian point of view what subjective probablities to assign. One would have to bring in substantive external assumptions to make the choice, and though this may be the way to go, such a procedure would no longer be Bayesian.
V.
The Verdict on Bayesianism
To summarize, the evaluation of Bayesianism, as of any philosophical system, must be made by weighing conflicting intuitions regarding the various propositions it requires us to accept and reject. Though Bayesian confirmation has well-known virtues that recommend it, on balance these are outweighed by a multiplicity of conceptual problems and counter-intuitive consequences. Besides the many prob lems well-known in the literature, I have added several more:
(1) A plethora of counter-intuitive results about the relevance of data in the 8 I am granting here that the Bayesian has a way to make the proper assignment of Pr= 1 to an existential hypothesis that has observed members, though it is not clear how Bayes Theorem applies to updating belief in existential hypotheses. In this case not only does the Bayesian have difficulty justifying the values of the priors, but the value of the likelihood is also problematic-is there a clear way to assign the probability that a given raven, r, is black given the vaguely stated ERH?
purported Bayesian "solutions" of the Raven paradox.
(2) Susceptibility to the full slate of paradoxes and trivializations that led to the demise of Hypothetico-Deductivism, including the problem of irrelevant con junction, Russell's winged-pig problem, and the problem of irrelevant disjunction.
(3) Bayesian concept of positive evidence as incremental raising of the degree of belief in the hypothesis is neither sufficient nor necessary for data to be evidential ly relevant in support of a hypothesis.
Where does this leave us? There is nothing wrong with Bayes Theorem itself, of course; it is simply a mathematical consequence of the probability calculus. The problem is its proposed application to confirmation theory. The above consid erations indicate that merely coherent revision of one's degrees of belief according to Bayes Theorem is not an adequate model for the relation of evidence, specifically for distinguishing what counts as evidentially relevant to what. The profligacy of the Bayesian explication of evidential relevance subverts the very notion of relevance. Arguing that some facts may have very little evidential value does not absolve Bayesianism of this epistemic sin. Of course some people may not have the intui tions about evidential relevance that I have appealed to, so the considerations we have put forward are not conclusive-one may choose to live in sin-but I judge that the combined force of relevance arguments against Bayesianism is sufficient to warrant considering alternatives.
VI.
Causal Ravens This is not the place to defend my general alternative to the Bayesian evidential relation9, so let me close with a sketch a possible solution to the Paradox of the Ravens that is non-invasive compared to the approaches just considered. It pro poses not to reject any of the elements of the paradox, but to argue instead that they are only apparently incompatible because of a mistake in translation. The problem, I will argue, arises from taking the translations of hypotheses and evidence into formal language too literally. If we insist on writing inductive arguments in a language designed for deductive inference it is not surprising that people will judge them using deductive standards, will expect them to conform to deductive inference rules, and will invariably be disappointed when they do not. My diagnosis is that the Raven Paradox and other trivializations that plague theories of confirmation arise because the paucity of our formal deductive languages requires all kinds of implication to be translated using logical implication, and that this translation illegitimately licenses transformations and inferences that do violence to the original 9 I have proposed an alternative explication of the confirmation relation in (Pennock 1991 Both logical expressions are descriptions of a universe in which there are no objects that are both ravens and non-black. Taken literally they say of ravens that all of them are black, and they say nothing else about them. They make no claim, for instance, about whether ravens are all black by definition, by happenstance, or by a law of nature. It might be that in this universe some ravens have naturally black plumage and that all the others, though they have naturally white plumage, are black because their feathers have been dyed. Now, if the logical symbolizations are good translations of the English propositions, then we should agree that the hypotheses as stated in English also mean just this and nothing more. If this is not so then the possibility exists that the two English expressions are also not equivalent. And if this is so then the paradox disappears. Now it is true that the English "All ravens are black" can mean any of the possibilities noted above in exactly the same way that the logical expression does. But is this ambiguous sense what we have in mind when we propose and judge it as a scientific hypothesis? The question is a little hard to answer since the example is the production of a philosopher investigating confirmation theory, not of a scientist investigating nature, and it is not a hypothesis that scientists would be likely to make. Nevertheless, we are asked to consider it to be a legitimate scientific hypothesis or at least a good model of one, and we can do so without too much difficulty. When we are then asked whether the hypothesis would be confirmed by observations of black ravens or white shoes, do we take the hypothesis in the wholly ambiguous Venn Diagram sense? I think it is clear that we do not, for people typically respond to the paradox when they hear it for the first time with a comment to the effect that white shoes don't confirm it because it is a hypothesis about ravens! -23-That is, the raven hypothesis is not a hypothesis about the universe as a whole, but one about the nature of birds. We see that this is so when we consider intuitions about the hypothesis that "The universe is such that objects that are ravens happen to be black and objects that are not-black happen not to be ravens." The redun dancy of this formulation more accurately captures the literal meaning of the logical universal conditional, but if this were all that "All ravens are black" meant then I think no one would find confirmatory observations of white shoes or green vases counterintuitive. But our intuitions do rebel at these observations and it must be because we take the meaning of the hypothesis to involve more than is or can be captured by the Venn diagram.
Specifically, I think we understand the hypothesis to mean that there is some thing about ravens that makes their color black-that their having the property is in some way a result of being a raven.
It is not an accidental fact about the world, and we are not keeping open the possibility of dyed feathers.
Nor is it a simple matter of definition-if we meant that, then there would be no reason to think that the statement was a hypothesis requiring confirmation by empirical test. What we mean is that there is nomological relation between being a raven and being black, a relation that is more than a mere accidental regularity. I take the position that underlying causal mechanisms distinguish lawful from accidental regularities. The reason the true generalization that all persons in my living room are persons wearing a wristwatch is not a law is that there is nothing about the room which causes persons in it to wear a wristwatch, nor is there anything about wearing a wristwatch that makes people be in the room, nor is there any common cause of both.
It is merely an accidental generalization and not a nomological generalization; we may not say of some person that if he were in the room he would be wearing a wristwatch -it is the causal mechanism that gives nomological generalizations their counter -factual import. I shall assume that any hypothesis that postulates a law is implicit ly a causal hypothesis, and so I take it that we assume that the raven hypothesis implies tacitly that there is some sort of causal connection between being a raven and being black, and that this is what we want to investigate. All ravens are black because of lawful causal processes in the world.
The hypothesis need not explicitly state the form that this causal connection takes. It might turn out that a thing's being a raven causes it to be black or, more likely, that there is a common cause (the bird's genetic structure) of both. These hypotheses, of course, are not captured by a translation using material implication or some alternative conditional in a richer logic. I won't review the literature of attempts to develop a formal "causal condi tional;" these have so far met with little success. In any case, no causal logic would license the move to the contrapositive (which is part of what generated the paradox in the first place), because the causal relation does not contrapose. If we try to do it, we would get something like "A thing's being non-black causes it to be a On the positive side we do expect black ravens to confirm the hypothesis because, if the hypothesis is true, an obvious expected effect would be that any given raven would be black, and we have some notion of the causal mechanisms (e. g., DNA, natural selection) by which this could occur.
The causal interpretation thus resolves the paradox, and it does so without necessarily rejecting any of its three elements-the Nicod Condition may remain if we so choose11; the Equivalence Condition is untouched; and Ornithologists are still not permitted to practice their science from their hearth-side armchairs. Only poets, and perhaps philosophers, may do that.
